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Abstract:  
 
The Payment for Environmental Services Program (PESP) of Costa Rica was a pioneer 
program to be developed using the notion of PES. The PESP has been analyzed as a very 
promising innovating instrument for conservation purpose and has been considered a 
reference model for PES development. As such, many scholars analyzed the PESP and 
have discussed its efficiency. Nevertheless, the genesis and the evolution of the Program 
has been poorly documented from a learning process and stakeholders perspectives 
 
In this working paper, we propose to analyze the genesis and evolution the PESP 
interpreting the continuity and inflexions it has experimented related to stakeholders’ learning 
process and evolution of their balance of power.  
 
We show that PES governance is a social construction where many stakeholders are 
interacting to orientate the objectives and the functioning of the PESP towards their interests 
and vision. We finally argue that PESP is not a mere market based instrument driven by a 
market coordination but an instrument driven by complex multi-stakeholder governance 
depending on the stakeholders’ learning process and balance of power. 
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Introduction  
 
Over the past decade, “Payments for Environmental Services” (PES) have received a great 
deal of attention as a natural-resource management approach (Landell-Mills and Porras, 
2002; Corbera et al., 2007; Engel et al., 2008; Wunder et al., 2008; Pattanayak et al., 2010). 
Wunder (2005, 2007) defines PES as voluntary transactions where a well-defined 
environmental service (ES) (or a land-use likely to secure that service) is being “bought by a 
minimum of one ES buyer from a minimum of one ES provider if and only if the ES provider 
secures ES provision during a determined time (conditionality)”. Pure PES schemes fulfilling 
all the criteria of Wunders definition may not always be possible, or even preferable (Wunder, 
2005; Corbera et al., 2007).  More recently, scholars have analyzed the institutional nature of 
PES, underlining the importance of the institutional and social context in which it takes place 
(Muradian et al., 2010; Sommerville et al., 2009; Vatn, 1010…). They usually consider PES 
as a social construction, reflecting a certain distribution of power among stakeholders, while 
often emphasizing the need for legitimacy as an important driver of its design and evolution 
(Corbera et al., 20047; Pascual et al., 2010).  
 
As a pioneer program using notion of PES, Costa Rican Payment for Environmental Services 
Program (PESP) has been analyzed as a very promising innovating instrument for 
conservation and has been considered a reference for PES schemes. Indeed, launched in 
1997 in order to incentive reforestation, forest conservation and sustainable forest 
management, the program has channeled more than two hundred million cumulative dollars 
invested1 (FONAFIFO, 2010), and over 700,000 ha of forest have been contracted in the 
program (some 13% of the national territory). Many scholars described the PESP as an 
innovative market based instrument for conservation (Pagiola et al. 2002; Pagiola, 2008; 
Rojas and Aylward, 2003), and discussed its efficiency (Daniels et al., 2010; Legrand et al., 
2010b, Sanchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007; Zbinden and Lee, 2005). Nevertheless, the analyses 
of the PESP dynamics of evolution and governance have been poorly documented. 
 
The objective of this working paper is to analyze the genesis and evolution of the PESP 
understanding the continuity and inflexions it experimented from the perspective of 
stakeholders’ interactions.  
 
To develop this analysis we rely on an extensive analysis of existing literature on the PESP, 
reviewing internal reports, decrees and manual of procedure issued by FONAFIFO. We also 
developed interviews of stakeholders directly involved in the genesis, evolution and 
management of the PESP as well as representative of stakeholders’ involved in the 
management of forest plot (producers, environmentalists,…). These stakeholders were 
invited to present their own trajectory, to describe their role played in the emergence and 
evolution of the PESP, as well as their perception about PESP from the emergence up to 
now. The interviews were recorded and each transcribed. We derived from this transcription 
of the individual interviews the key moment in the PESP adoption and evolution, as well as 
the perception and strategy of their interests groups.  
  
In this chapter, we firstly describe the basic features of PESP has it has been design and 
implemented at its initial stage following the 4th forestry law of 1996, and analyze this basic 
features as the results of interaction between stakeholders’ groups involved in forest issues. 
In the second part, we describe the evolution of the key features of PESP on the period 
1997-2010, and analyze these evolutions in the light of the evolution of the balance of 
resources of stakeholders’ groups. 
 
 
1  This  reference  corresponds  to  data  available  on  FONAFIFO  website  : 
http://www.fonafifo.go.cr/paginas_espanol/servicios_ambientales/sa_estadisticas.htm 
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1 – The basic features of PESP  
 
Aiming at facing deforestation and improving the country’s forest cover, the PESP has been 
instituted by the 4th Costa Rican forestry law (# 7575) adopted in April 1996. It has been built 
on the experience of the exiting schemes of “forest incentives”2 of which it inherited many of 
its main features (Daniels et al., 2010; Legrand et al., 2010a; Pagiola et al., 2008).  
1.1. The core principles of PESP 
The core principle of PESP is to compensate the forest private landowners for the 
environmental services (ES) generated by their forests (figure 1). The basic elements that set 
the ground for the implementation of PESP were defined in the law 7575 which recognizes 
and defines the ES provision by forest and forest plantation, a fund managing body 
(FONAFIFO) and a primary source of funding.  
a- The functioning of the scheme 
 
The law 7575 of 1996 made National Fund for Forest Financing (“Fondo Nacional de 
Financiamiento Forestal” - FONAFIFO), a public non-governmental trust fund, responsible for 
researching and managing of funds to finance the PESP. It defines that a third of the existing 
hydrocarbon tax will be channeled to the FONAFIFO to pay for forest private owners’ 
environmental services.  
 
Following market based principles, the forest landowners cede their rights on their forest ES 
to Fonfafifo that sells them to end beneficiaries (for example hydroelectric companies or 
breweries for water services or through the carbon market, see figure 1). A formal contract is 
established between FONAFIFO and forest landowner to set the transaction. This contract is 
conditioned to the existence of a forest management plan with which the forest owners are 
committed to comply. This management plan is issued by a forestry regent3, contracted by 
the forest owners, and who is in charge of monitoring the compliance of the PES contract, 
acting as third party control of PES contract between Forest owner and FONAFIFO. 
At the beginning of the program, while FONAFIFO has the responsibility of the financial 
management of the program, most of the operational management (selection and 
contracting) was carried on by the National System of Conservation Areas (“Sistema 
National de Area de Conservacion” - SINAC4). 
 
During the first years of the program, no prioritization of the applications was made: they 
were selected on the principle “first in – first contracted”. The conditions of access were 
similar to the ones defined in the previous existing instruments. The applicants were asked to 
present a management plan and to have formal land property rights. For the payments to be 
done, the contractual obligations of the PESP participants need to figure in the land tenure 
2  These  forest  incentives  (“incentivos  forestales”)  schemes  started  in  late  70’s  and  aimed  at  fostering 
reforestation  (Income  tax  credit,  Forest  payment  certificate  –  “Certificado  de  abono  forestal”  –  CAF,  and 
Advanced Forest payment certificate – “Certificado de Abono Forestal por Adelantado” – CAFA schemes), forest 
payment certificate for management (“Certificado de Abono Forestal por Manejo de Bosque ‐ CAFMA scheme) 
and forest protection certificate (Certificado de Proteccion del Bosque ‐ CPB) – (Daniels et al., 2010). 
3 The forestry regent (“regent forestal”)  is a formal body created by the forestry  law 7575. They are  licensed 
forester,  which  has  the  public  power  (“fe  publica”)  of  authenticate  the  management  plan  of  private 
landowners. They are accredited by the Agronomist College (“colegio de agronomos”), which is in charge of the 
monitoring and control of forestry regent activities. 
4  According  to  the  biodiversity  law  (1998),  the  SINAC  is  an  institutional  system  of  decentralized  and 
participative management  that  integrates  the  skills of  the Ministry of  the environment  (MINAE)  in  terms of 
forestry, wildlife and wildlife protected areas  in order  to dictate  the policies, plan and  implement processes 
aiming  at  the  sustainability of natural  resources management of Costa Rica.  The  SINAC  is made of 11  sub‐
systems called conservation areas and a central office. (http://www.sinac.go.cr/informacion.php) 
  
registry, so that the contract applies to future owners in case the lands are sold. At the 
beginning of the program, the payments were done through “forest payment certificates”, 
monetary titles that can be used for any payments.  
 
Figure 1 : Basic principles of PESP functioning 
 
Source: authors derived from interviews to FONAFIFO administrative 
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b- Environmental services and modalities  
 
The law # 7575 defines the environmental services as « those that offer forest and forest 
plantations and that have an impact on protection and improvement of the environment ». It 
recognizes four environmental services: greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, water 
protection, biodiversity protection and scenic beauty.  
 
When the PESP began in 1997, three modalities of PES were defined in line with existing 
forest incentives schemes: a PES for forest conservation (former CPB), a PES for forest 
management (former CAFMA), and a PES for reforestation (that covers former CAF and 
CAFA) - (Le Coq et al., 2010a). For each modality a payment level per hectares of land was 
defined. In 1997, the payments levels were 227 $US. Ha-1 for forest protection modality5, 365 
$US Ha-1 for forest management modality and 545 $US Ha-1 for reforestation modality, for the 
whole duration of the contracts, that is to say respectively some 5, 5 and 8 years6. These 
amounts were set to correspond to the minimum acceptable by the land owner to cover the 
cost of reforestation (PES reforestation) or sustainable management practices (PES 
management), or to cover minimal cost of opportunity of forest conservation (PES 
protection)7. 
7 
                                                
5 The exchange rate used is the one at 12/31/2006.  
6 The beneficiaries’ obligations can last more time (20 years for forest protection, 15 years for reforestation). 
7 The  level of 227 $US of conservation PES  in 1997, which correspond to   45.4 ha‐1 year‐1  is more or  less the 
opportunity cost of extension cattle raising, which was one of the major alternative of forestry  in the 60‐90s 
(Legrand  et  al.,  2010a);  it  also  a mode  level  of  the  different  evaluation  of  potential  annual  cost  for  the  4 
services, and the market local cost of renting an hectare of pasture (Castro et al., 2000) 
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c- The PESP governance bodies and texts  
 
FONAFIFO’s board is in charge of defining the main strategic options and validating the 
financial management. According to the law # 7575, its board is composed by a) 2 
representatives of private sector nominated by the National Forestry office (“ONF”) including 
one representative of small and medium forestry producers and one representative of the 
industrial sector, and b) 3 representatives of public sector including one representative of the 
ministry of environment (MINAET), one representative of the Ministry of Agriculture (MAG) 
and one representative of the national banking system. 
 
The implementation of PESP is driven by two main legal instruments that are annually 
updated: 1) an annual decree, signed by the Ministry of Environment, which defines the 
eligible PES modalities and the total budget allocation for each of them, and 2) a manual of 
procedure, that defines the conditions of access to PES, the requisites, the priority criteria’s 
and administrative rules. A new version of these documents are prepared each year by 
FONAFIFO’s executive management that are submitted for commentaries to three main 
actors: the SINAC representing the administration in charge of environmental agenda, the 
ONF representing forestry private sector, and the college of agronomist that supervise the 
forestry regents activities. After consultation, the decree and manual of procedure are finally 
approved by FONAFIFO’s board, signed by the Ministry of Environment.  
 
1.2. The genesis of the PESP and stakeholders’ role  
If PESP is a new program, its genesis is embedded in a long history of policy instrument to 
face deforestation issue (Daniels et al., 2010; Le Coq et al, 2010a, 2010b), where several 
stakeholders were involved. We analyze here the context of the genesis of the PESP and the 
vision, interests, resources and organization of the stakeholders involved in forest issues.  
a- The PESP context of formulation  
 
In the early 90th a third forestry law had been voted by the legislative assembly and rejected 
by the constitutional court. Thus, a process of formulation of reform of the forestry law was 
then in the policy agenda since 1990. In 1992, due to opposition between the ministry of 
agriculture and ministry of environment, the reformulation process of the forestry law was 
stopped. Although several instruments to promote reforestation, sustainable management 
and conservation of forest existed, the forest cover was reaching a very low level8. In the 
1994, the newly elected president, José Maria Figures Olsen, who had put sustainable 
development as one of its political priority, reactivated the process of reformulation of the 
forestry law, leading to the setting of a policy window (Le Coq et al., submitted). In mid 1990, 
when the project for a new forestry law was designed, various elements of context were 
changing. Firstly, since the late 80’s Costa Rica was facing a severe budget crisis and the 
support to forestry sector through direct budget allocation (called “forest incentives”) became 
more and more difficult to obtain. With the signature of an agreement between Costa Rican 
Ministry of Economy and the International Monetary Fund, existing “forest incentives”, were 
considered as subsidies and banished, leading to the necessity to reformulate the 
instruments to support forest sector. Secondly, since the international forum of Rio in 1992, 
the role of forest in the Climate change and biodiversity conservation issue was emphasized; 
the opportunity to fund forest conservation through possible carbon compensation 
mechanism was rising. Finally, in this context of constraints and opportunities, the necessity 
to reform the law to better face deforestation problem, promote forest conservation and 
define new forms of supporting sector appears as a stringent necessity (Legrand et al., 
2010a; Le Coq et al., 2010a).  
8 Costa Rica had 75% of its area of forest in 1940, and a mere 21 % in 1987 (FONAFIFO, 2005). 
  
9 
b- The stakeholders’ interest groups around forest issue 
 
Three main groups of stakeholders can be identified that differ in term of vision, interests and 
positions about forestry problem and forestry policy orientation (figure 2): 1) the 
representative of agricultural sectors, which in the 80-90s were basically considering the 
forest as an empty, “unproductive” space; 2) the representative of forest sector that consider 
the forest as a “productive” space and provider of primary material (Wood) for the industry, 
and 3) the environmental groups representatives that consider mainly forest as a habitat to 
be protected to maintain plants and animals biodiversity (Le Coq et al., 2010b).  
 
Figure 1 : Vision and interests of stakeholders’ groups in 1994-1996 
 
sectors  
  Agricultural Forestry Environmental  
Stakeholders’ groups 
  
Large 
agricultural 
(business) 
farmers 
Small holder 
farmers 
(peasant) 
Small forestry 
farmer 
Large forestry 
entrepreneurs, 
wood industrial 
Environmentalists 
and ecologists 
Leading professional 
representatives  CNA, Laica 
MNC*,  
Upa Nacional Junaforca CCF FECON 
Public institutions Ministry of Agriculture and animal husbandry  
                                    Ministry of Environment  
DGF SINAC 
Main Forest vision Forest as an empty space « unproductive space » 
Forest as a provider of good 
 (and services – especially Carbon 
sequestration) 
Forest as support 
of biodiversity 
Main interests on 
forest issue 
Maintain land 
use extension 
for agricultural 
purpose 
Develop 
agricultural 
production and 
forestry (agro 
forestry) 
Sustain forestry 
activity 
 (community 
management for 
income 
generation) 
Sustain forestry 
activity  
(wood 
production for 
industry) 
Maintain 
biodiversity and 
natural ecosystem
Involvement in the 
formulation of 
forestry law 
Very low Low Fair High Low 
Position regarding       
 
Recognition of 
SE provision 
by forest 
- Positive  Positive  Positive  Positive  
PES mechanism - Positive Positive  Positive  Positive  
Priority PESP 
modalities  - 
 Favorable to  
Agro-forestry 
Favorable to 
management, 
reforestation, 
conservation, 
and Agro Forestry 
Favorable to 
management, 
reforestation, 
and 
conservation 
favorable to 
conservation, 
opposed to 
management 
Ban of land use 
change  Not favorable Favorable if compensations Favorable 
NB: - = no data ; * = MNC : Mesa Nacional Campesina 
Source: Based on stakeholders’ interviews 2008-2010 
 
 
In the mid 1990, when the forestry law 7575 was formulated and set the ground to the PESP, 
these three groups of stakeholders was in asymmetric situations in terms of involvement and 
political resources (figure 3). Whereas agricultural sector was a major force in the country 
until the 90’s, the agricultural sector was facing many difficulties at the beginning of the 90’s 
with a structural adjustment plan that affected strongly agricultural institutions, and led to 
strong division at syndicate levels between small farmers’ movement and large farmers. 
Indeed, in the 94-96 periods the agricultural sector representative was poorly represented in 
the forestry law formulation process (Morilhat, 2011). Whereas national environmental 
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consciousness and the number of environmentalist organizations was rising in the early 
1990s (Steinberg, 2001), the environmental representatives groups as newly created 
FECON were formally poorly represented in the formulation process (Morilhat, 2011). 
However, two law proposals reforms were proposed by deputies that cope with 
environmentalist and ecosystemic vision were proposed in 1994 and 19959.  
 
Figure 3: Involvement and policy resources of stakeholders’ groups during the 
formulation of the 4th forestry law in 1994-1996 
 
 
sectors  
  Agricultural Forestry Environmental  
Stakeholders’ groups 
  
Large 
agricultural 
(business) 
farmers 
Small holder 
farmers 
(peasant) 
Small forestry 
farmer 
Large forestry 
entrepreneurs, 
wood industrial 
Environmentalists 
and ecologists 
Involvement in the 
formulation of 
forestry law 
Very low Low Fair High Low 
Institutional 
Resources  
Strong alliance 
with MAG 
Low conflict 
with MAG 
Conflicting alliance 
with Ministry of 
Environment 
Strong alliance 
with Ministry of  
Environment 
Conflicting alliance 
with SINAC 
Organizational 
resources 
Strong 
 but low 
mobilization 
Fair 
(atomization  
en various 
movement) 
Good 
 (representation 
JUNAFORCA 
including grassroots 
organizations) 
Strong 
(representation of 
CCF  including 
with grassroots 
organization) 
Fair  
(a leading 
organization FECON)
Political resources  Strong Low Low 
Strong 
Majority fraction 
of PLN* 
Limited 
(majority fraction 
of PLN*) 
Technical resources  
Good  
(but 
agronomists) 
Limited Limited 
Strong 
with  Academic 
support (Ecological 
Economics) 
and Agronomist 
college (including 
forestry engineer) 
Academic support 
from biologist from 
university and 
biologic college 
Public opinion 
Not favorable 
(large scale 
agriculture affects 
natural 
resources) 
Favorable 
(Small farmers 
doesn’t affects 
natural resources
Favorable  
(traditional Forest as 
provider of services) 
Mitigate 
(“wood cuter”/ 
forest provider of 
services) 
Very favorable  
(forest as a natural 
resource, 
biodiversity) 
Financial resources 
Important  
(but not oriented 
toward theme) 
Limited  
(Support from 
NGO) 
Limited  
(Support from 
international NGO) 
Important 
(support from 
major funding 
agency -USAID, 
GTZ) 
Fair  
(Support from 
international NGO) 
NB: * PLN National liberation party (Partido de liberacion nacional)  
Source: Based on stakeholders’ interviews 2008-2010 
 
In the mid 1990, the main group of stakeholders that was mobilized and was strongly 
empowering the discussion around the formulation of the policy was the forestry one (figure 
3). This groups was composed of local forestry organizations that have been developed in 
the 80s in all the regions of Costa Rica, as well as national representative organizations that 
were in mid 90s federated in a national platform, the Costa Rican Forestry Chamber 
(Camara Costaricense Forestal - CCF), which counted with the representation of large 
private forestry entrepreneurs and wood industrials as well as representative of Small 
                                                
9 The first one, called cut only what has been planted (CULPA ‐ “cortar unicamente lo que se ha plantado”) was 
presented in July 1994 by a depute of the party of liberation national (PLN), Otton Solis; another proposal was 
proposed  in  February  1995  by  another  the  depute  of  PLN,  Luis  Martinez  (Morilhat,  2011,  Le  Coq  et  al., 
submitted) 
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forestry producers regrouped in the National Assembly of Forestry Peasant (Junta Nacional 
Forestal Campesina - Junaforca) and which counted the support from international 
cooperation (Le Coq et al., 2010a). Aside the organization of the private forestry sector, 
public forestry administration has been strengthened with the creation in 1990 of the General 
Direction of Forestry within the Ministry of Environment. Whereas some differences of vision 
were existing inside the forestry stakeholders’ group, especially between small forestry and 
large enterprise representatives, a common vision emerged around the necessity to maintain 
forestry support instruments (and give continuity to existing support instrument), and to 
consider forest area for both the products (wood) and the services that the forest can provide 
to the society (especially carbon), services that can provide a new form of justifying the 
support to the forest sector through a PES scheme.  
 
c- The basic principle as the reflect of a compromise leaded by forestry sector 
stakeholders 
 
The basic principle of the PESP set in the law 7575 reflected of compromise leaded by 
forestry sector stakeholders. The process of formulation of the law leading to the emergence 
of the PESP led to an opposition between the different stakeholders and interests’ groups10.   
 
Three projects of law were introduced in the parliamentary depute committee in charge of 
formulating the law, the committee for agriculture and natural resource affairs (CPAARN): 
one was proposed by the Ministry of Environment, René Castro, developed through 
consultation with CCF and forestry stakeholders, another developed by the depute Otton 
solis, entitled CULPA, and a third by the president of the CPAARN, Luis Martinez. The first 
one reflected a compromise inside the stakeholders of forestry sectors (between public and 
private representatives), the second and the third one, was in line with environmentalist 
vision, arguing for a prohibition of forest exploitation, and tending to orient the instrument 
toward the conservation of forest (Morilhat, 2011, Legrand et al. 2010a). A subcommittee 
was formed to make a synthesis text of these 3 versions, which was discussed and approved 
in commission in late 1995. The introduction of the PES principles emerges in the final 
version of the text in early 1996 (Morilhat, 2011), and was then quickly adopted by the 
assembly in February 1996 under the pressure of the risk to see a pure disappearance of 
existing mechanism of support to forest sector according to the agreement between FMI and 
Costa Rican ministry of economy and thanks to the ability of two policy entrepreneurs, Rene 
Castro and Luis Martinez (Le Coq et al., submitted).   
 
The initial governance and functioning of PESP that is set in the forestry law reflects a 
compromise between diverse positions and interests of stakeholders concerned by the 
deforestation problem. By the way, the principle of recognition of ES provided by the forest, 
and the principle of PESP was not thoroughly discussed, but it represents a tacit consensus 
between the forestry and environmental stakeholders. For the forestry stakeholders, it was a 
way to justify the continuity of the support to forestry activities; for the environmental 
representative, it was a way to introduce the ecosystemic concern in the forestry policies (Le 
Coq et al., submitted). The prohibition of land use change was the main point initial of 
disagreement for some stakeholders’ of the forestry sector since it was considered by them 
as an infringement to the liberty of use rights of private propriety. Nevertheless, it became 
acceptable for them because 1) they were conscious of the risk of wood shortage for wood 
industry if the forest resources were still decreasing more, 2) the prohibition of land use 
change was linked with the possibility to appeal to public forces to protect invasion of forest 
area by producers, which is a way to reinforce property right against squatters, 3) a clear 
financial compensation principle was set in the law to compensate the restriction of their land 
use right through PES mechanism.  
 
10 For more detail on the policy process, see Le Coq et al. (submitted); Morilhat (2011). 
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Finally, the basic governance of PESP reflects the interests of the forestry stakeholders. 
First, the definition of forest include regenerated forest or plantation, and the PESP 
modalities include reforestation and also forest management (that enables extraction of 
wood), that were questioned by the environmentalists stakeholders. Second, the laws assign 
the management of the PESP to a forestry institution (FONAFIFO), which governance rule 
(board composition) is favorable to forests stakeholders since its board is composed by 
representatives nominated by the newly created national forestry office (ONF)11. Third, the 
control of the execution of the management plan, that is a conditionality of PES contract, was 
given to forestry regent, that are private forestry engineers12.  
 
2- The evolution of PESP   
 
The different key elements of the functioning of the PESP have evolved overtime between 
1997 and 2011. We firstly describe these key changes and then we analyze this change in 
light of the balance of resources and power of the different stakeholders’ groups. 
 
2.1. The evolution of the PESP features  
 
The evolution of PESP can be grasped through three elements: 1) the funding sources, 2) 
the payment features including the type of eligible modalities, the levels of payments and 
prioritization of payments, 3) the management structure and rules. 
a- The consolidation and diversification of funding resources  
 
Consolidation of the funding resources is a main issue for PESP sustainability. Since its 
creation, the sources of funding of the program have been increasing and diversifying 
overtime (figure 4), in a way that reflects partially the intent to make the ES users finance the 
program. 
 
The first issue was to ensure the payment of the fuel tax that was set in the law # 7575 as 
the basic funding system of the PESP. In 1997 and 1998, the Ministry of Finance resisted its 
obligation to pay FONAFIFO one third of the amount raised by this tax (Government of 
Costa-Rica, 1998). With the help of the Ministry of the Environment, the forestry sector 
fought and reached an agreement with the Ministry of Finance to secure the financing of the 
program when was discussed the law of tax simplification in 2001. According to this law, a 
unique hydrocarbon tax was created of which 3,5% was clearly earmarked for the 
FONAFIFO to fund the PESP, leading to a consolidation of the PESP funding. Thus, even 
the negotiated level has been set to one third of the amount stated in the forest law, the 
financing from the fuel tax increased when the fuel tax scheme changed. Finally, fuel tax is 
still the most important and consolidated source of funding of the PESP for the 1997-2010 
period (Legrand et al., 2010a).  
 
The efforts to take advantage global carbon market, which was supposed initially to become 
one of the main funding sources of the program, has resulted quiet disappointing until now. 
While the government of Norway signed a 2 million US$ contract in 1997, which was 
considered a pioneer carbon deal, no other funding has been raised through the carbon 
market, as the rule of Clean Development Mechanisms and Kyoto protocol defined after the 
launching of Costa Rican PESP do not permitted Costa Rican PES to be eligible.  
 
Thus, FONAFIFO administration has also tends to diversify the PESP funding sources. Since 
1998, voluntary private agreements with the national private sector (hydropower and water 
companies, breweries…) for the funding of the PESP have been promoted rapidly. Further, 
11  The national  forestry office  (ONF)  is  also  created by  the  law 7575  as  a  rector  agency  leaded by  forestry 
organization to propose policy (Barantes, 2009). 
12 Article 21 of the law 7575. 
  
the “ES certificate” 13 was created in 2001. It targets private investors willing to invest in ES 
generation, especially for carbon offset. If the numbers of contract has been quickly raised, 
the funding source through of private enterprise still limited (figure 4). 
 
To maintain and extend PESP scope, additional funding resources were sought from 
international donors. Since 2001, international cooperation has contributed in a significant 
way to the funding of the PESP. The World Bank and the Global Environment Facility (GEF) 
have supported FONAFIFO with respectively a 40 million US$ loan and a 5 million US$ grant 
in the framework of the Ecomarkets project14. The loan substituted itself to the government 
obligation to channel a part of the amount raised through the hydrocarbon tax and did not 
bring additional resources to the program. This was not the case of the funding raised 
through the MMBIEM project, the following of the Ecomarkets project, for the 2008-2012 
period. It consists of a 40 million US$ loan from World Bank and a 10 million US$ grant from 
GEF, a major part of which has been channeled through the “Biodiversity Conservation Trust 
Fund”, that was been created in 2006 to “serve as the repository of other grants, and of 
income from sales of conservation certificates in the voluntary market” (Pagiola, 2008). 
Furthermore, a 10 million Euros agreement with KfW, from the German cooperation, was 
reached in 2003 for the funding of the program. 
 
Finally, since 2005, according to the reform of the water fee on water use, an obligation to 
channel one fourth of the amount raised to the PESP, this additional resources justified by 
hydraulic services contribution of forest raise new opportunity of funding. Nowadays, it still 
limited since this tax will be gradually be put in place in the following years, but may 
represent an important amount of additional resources. 
 
Figure 4: Amount and origin of funding resources of PESP from 1997 to 2010 (in 
million of colons*) 
13 
                                                
 
Source: FONAFIFO 
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b‐ Modification and diversification of PES payment  
 
The payment structure has evolved over time, regarding eligible modalities of PES, the 
amounts of payment by modality, the targeting of the payment and the differentiation of the 
payment.   
 
13 « Certificado de Servicio Ambiental (CSA) » 
14 The Ecomarkets (« Ecomercados » in spanish) project has been funded by the GEF, the World Bank and the 
Government of Costa Rica for the 2001‐2005 period. This project of 62 millions USD aimed to strengthen and 
expand the PESP (Hartshorn and al. 2005). 
  
Evolution of eligible modalities. Three main changes in the PESP modalities occurred in 
the last 15 years (figure 5): 1) the suppression from 2002 to 2009 of the forest management 
PES modality, 2) the inclusion of the agro forestry systems PES modality since 2003 and 3) 
the inclusion of the natural regeneration modality PES since 2006.  
 
Figure 5 : Evolution of modality and level of payment of PES from 1997 to 2010 
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Source : FONAFIFO 
year Re-forestation 
mana-
gement
established 
plantation AFS
on pasture
(colones o 
$US* ha-1)
(colones o 
$US* ha-1)
(colones o 
$US* ha-1)
(colones o 
$US* ha-1)
(colones o 
$US* trees-
1)
( $US* ha-1) ( $US* ha-1) ( $US* ha-1)
1997 50000 120000 80225 - - -
1998 60000 154000 94000 60000 - -
1999 60000 154000 94000 60000 - -
2000 66000 169000 - - - -
2001 72600 185900 113300 - - -
2002 79160 202700 123540 - - -
2003 87100 223000 - 87100 320 -
2004 95800 245000 - - 320 -
2005 320 816 - - 1,3 - -
2006 320 816 - - 1,3 816 205
2007 320 816 - - 1,3 816 205
2008 320 816 - - 1,3 816 205
in forest 
protection 
area
for hydraulic 
ressources
in 
conservation 
gap"
on 
pasture 
(kyoto)
2009 320 320 400 375 980 - 1,3 205 205 320
2010 320 320 400 375 980 250 1,3 205 205 320
forest protection natural regeneration 
 
Evolution of payment level. The evolution of the payments has been marked by a 
substantial increase of the level of the payments and the dollarization of the payments, both 
obtained in 2005 (figure 5). The levels of payment went respectively from 234 US$ ha-1 to 
320 US$ ha-1 for the forest protection modality, from 599 USD/ha to 816 USD/ha for the 
reforestation modality and from 0,86 USD/tree to 1,3 USD/tree15. The reforestation modality 
has been made more profitable later on by raising the level of payment to 980 US$ ha-1 in 
2009 and by reducing the duration of the contract from 10 to 5 years between 2008 and 2009 
while the level of payment remained the same.  
 
Regarding evolution of the priority, with the change from existing policy to PESP policy, 
the majority of funds have evolved given more room to forest conservation orientation that 
represent an average of 70% of the resource allocation of PESP over the 1997 – 2010 
period. The distribution of the funds among the different modalities shows then the 
prevalence of the forest protection modality during the whole period of time (figure 6).  
  
15 Amounts in 2004 that were in local currency (« colones ») have been converted in USD using exchange rate 
at 12/31/2003. 
  
Figure 6: Evolution of budget assignment of PESP per modalities from 1997 to 2009 
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Source : FONAFIFO16 
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Condition of access. Some measures have been taken to ease the participation of small 
landholders since the first years of the program. In 1998, a system of collective contract, that 
allow some small landholders to apply together to the PESP has been created in order to 
lower the transaction costs assumed by the land owner to contract a forestry regent and 
make the application forms. This practice was abandoned in 2002, since it has the 
drawbacks of creating additional delays due to heterogeneity of situation of farmers17. 
Nevertheless, to facilitate access to small landowners, a quota has been attributed to local 
forestry organizations that facilitate the preparation of the application of small land owners. 
Furthermore, to enables small landowners that did not have registered land title to access 
which is a major impediments of numerous small holders in Costa Rica, the requirement of 
formal land tenure rights for the participation to the PESP was abolished in 2002.   
 
Targeting of payment. At the beginning of the program, the basic principle was “first in time, 
first in rights”. The demand of PES was analyzed according to the moment and order of 
reception at FONAFIFO office. Progressively, some criteria have been defined to prioritize 
applications to the PESP in order to target the most important lands for ES provision (mainly 
water and biodiversity services). Thus, a system of prioritization of the demand was put in 
place since 2002. The applications are prioritized according to their locations, giving priority 
to private land inside national parks and biologic corridor defined by GRUAS I mapping, a 
proposal of land uses planning for biodiversity conservation that served as a basis for the 
definition of PESP priority areas. In 2004, a social criterion was also aggregated that gives 
priority to the forest owner located in districts of low development index.  
 
Differentiation of payment. At the beginning of the program the level of payment was equal 
for each modality whatever location of the land (and ES provision of this land). Since 2009, a 
differentiation of level payment has been initiated for conservation PES contracts to tends to 
differentiate according to ES provision. Thus, an additional payment of 80 US$ ha-1 is given 
for the PES protection contract for the land that have an interest to maintain hydrological 
services, and a 55 $US ha-1 additional payment is given for land located in critical zones for 
biodiversity according Gruas II and located outside parks and existing corridors (figure 5). By 
the way, for the natural regeneration PES modality, the land that may be eligible to funding 
through Kyoto protocol can receive an additional payment of 115 US$ ha-1 compared with 
classical natural regeneration contracts (figure 5). 
16 For the years 2006 and 2007, the amounts contracted for the modality natural regeneration are included in 
the amount of the reforestation modality. 
17 As the application was collective, the payment was done only when all the forests owners of the groups were 
complying with all the requisites. Thus, it was current that, because of some farmers were not complying with 
some requisites, the other were not receiving payments even if they individually comply with the requisites. 
  
16 
c- Evolution of PESP management  
 
Since its creation, the management of PESP has evolved regarding: 1) the operational 
processes (administrative procedure of application), and 2) regarding the institutional 
structure (control and monitoring functions).The operational processes of the PESP has 
experimented various changes. First, in order to reduce applications costs for conservation 
PES, the management plan required has been simplified. The ex ante control of application 
regarding administrative requisites has been also simplified; the control of contracts has 
been optimized though a system of Geographic Information System facilitating the constant 
monitoring of the program, and the control of the effect of the program on land uses. The 
program has also evolved towards the facilitation of the payment methods to the beneficiary. 
At the beginning of the program, the payment to landowners was done through certificates 
(value checks), before being done through bank checks in 2002. In 2005, the payment for ES 
has been facilitated through direct deposit in landowner’s bank account which reduces time 
and cost of management for both FONAFIFO and the landowners.  
 
The institutional structure of the program has experimented two major changes since 1997: 
1) the attribution of the integral administrative management of PESP to FONAFIFO since 
2003, and 2) the change of status of FONAFIFO since 2008. 
 
At the beginning of the program, the implementation of the program was shared between 
SINAC and FONAFIFO, the SINAC was in charge of receiving the application, analyzing the 
application and checking the compliance of criteria according to the manual of procedure, 
and even prioritizing the application according its own local criteria. FONAFIFO was in 
charge of the final decision, and the payment procedure. In 2002, the management and 
responsibility between SINAC and FONAFIFO was reformed. The FONAFIFO took then the 
control of all the procedure from application reception to payment procedure, and the 
responsibility of the SINAC was concentrated to its genuine mission of deforestation control. 
This change enables a better control of the process of prioritization of the demands 
according to FONAFIFO objectives and strategy. This transfer of responsibility led also 
FONAFIFO to develop its own regional office in 200318. As FONAFIFO did not received 
additional financial resources for assuming these new responsibilities, it led to the raise of 
the FONAFIFO operating costs due to an increase of its employees, which rise from some 15 
persons in 1998 to some 35 persons in 2005.   
 
Secondly, following a decision from the general control body of the republic, FONAFIFO 
became a public entity in 2008. This lead to a further very important increase of its staff (from 
52 up to 100 employees between 2008 and 2010) in order to comply with the legal 
obligations (especially internal control and employee status) to which such an entity is 
subject. This has also raised dramatically operating cost of FONAFIFO from 12% of activities 
to some 20 % of the budget (Legrand et al., 2010a). This additional cost is born by the 
FONAFIFO on the financial resources they collect.  
 
The analysis of the evolution of PESP shows a continuity and consolidation of the program 
especially regarding funding sources and management practices, but also some adjustments 
and adjustment in the orientation of the PESP regarding types of modalities, targeting and 
differentiation of payment. In the following part, we analyze the reasons of these evolutions 
from a stakeholder’s perspective.  
 
 
 
                                                
18 In 2003, seven regional offices of FONAFIFO were created. Two additional offices were created in 2004 and 
2005 by splitting existing offices to facilitate management. Nowadays, FONAFIFO has 9 regional offices covering 
all the country. To reduce the cost, these offices are generally located in the regional building of the SINAC. 
  
17 
2.2. The PESP evolution, balance of power and learning process of stakeholders 
 
The evolution of the PESP can be interpreted as the result of a learning process and the 
evolution of the balance of power between stakeholders involved in the forest issue. We can 
define 3 main periods where the balance of power among stakeholders changed and led to 
substantial changes in the PESP (figure 7). 
 
Figure 7 : Key Changes in PESP according to stakeholders’ interests (1997-2010) 
 1997-2001 2002-2006 2006-2010 
Forestry 
sector 
stakeholders’ 
interests 
1998-1999: inclusion of 
"established plantation" 
modality 
2001-2002: Reactivation of 
“forest management” 
modality 
2003: reintroduction for 
“established plantation” 
modality 
2009/2010 : reevaluation of 
amount of “reforestation” 
modality 
2010: reactivation of “forest 
management” modality 
2001: consolidation of 
earmarked funding to 
FONAFIFO (fuel tax 
reform) 
2003 : consolidation of the 
responsibilities of FONAFIFO 
in PESP management 
2009: creation of “natural 
regeneration” modality and  
differentiation of payment 
according to water ES 
Environmental 
stakeholders’ 
interests 
2000: administrative 
suppression of " forest 
management" modality 
2003 : suppression of PES for 
forest management 
2004: suppression of PES for 
“established plantation” 
2003:  priority setting to 
biologic corridor 
2009 : differentiation of PES 
payment according to 
biodiversity ES 
2006: creation of a fund for 
biodiversity 
 2003 : priority setting to low poverty index  Agricultural 
sector 
stakeholders’  
interests 
 2003: inclusion of SAF modality 
2011 : negotiation of a new 
modality for SAF café 
Source: Stakeholders’ interviews 2009-2010 
a- 1997-2001: the consolidation of PESP oriented by the forestry stakeholders  
During this first phase, the power of the forestry sector productive groups was still important 
in the orientation of the PESP. During the second half of 1990s, the CCF still maintain and 
strengthen its power, enlarging its memberships to reach 152 affiliates in 1999 and 
developing services to their members. In the same time, the ONF was creating. During this 
period, the PESP still basically in the continuity of the existing forestry incentive instrument; 
the modalities are those of existing instruments according to vision of these stakeholders. 
Using its leadership in the governance of the PESP, an additional modality was even created 
in 1998 and 1999 in line with the interest of forest productive groups of interest:  the PES for 
established plantation (figure 7).  
 
Although few stakeholders knew about the concept of SE and PSE when the law # 7575 was 
formulated and adopted, with the beginning of the implementation of the PESP, the 
knowledge for the stakeholders of various groups experimented begun to increase. In 1998, 
a newly elected president, Miguel Angel Rodriquez, following the advice of the vice minister 
of environment, Carlos Manuel Rodriguez, organized a large process of national consultation 
on the PESP to inform and to raise awareness of stakeholders on the program. This 
extensive and large consultation19 led to question the PESP on many points such as the 
enlargement of the scope of the PES to all activities that provide ES (out of forest which is its 
main original purpose). A project of law was developed to enlarge the spectrum of PESP 
including new ecosystems. The idea of a creation of a bank of environment, where all the 
payment could be concentrated on for any ES providers, was proposed. Nevertheless this 
                                                
19  In  1998‐1999,  a  national  workshop  was  organized  and  3  regional  workshops.  In  these  workshops,  the 
participation  was  large  including  the  various  ministries,  representatives  of  private  industrial  sector,  of 
environmentalists’ groups, of universities, and public enterprises of water distribution and energy production.  
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project of law appears too ambitious and difficult to put in practice because, on one side, all 
the sector was claiming for funds as ES providers (including banana, coffee sector,..) and, on 
the other side, the ES users (such as public water distributor, and energy producers) was not 
ready to pay as ES users. In this condition, the project was abandoned. But this process led 
to broadcast information and enlarge appropriation of the meaning of the concept of PES 
among the agricultural and environmental stakeholders. It also raises the attention on the 
necessity to secure the funding source of PESP and diversify it. In line with this 
appropriation, some first contracts were signed with some private enterprises to fund the 
PES system.  
 
With the beginning of the PESP implementation, environmentalist stakeholders began to pay 
more attention its effects PESP. In the 1998, a multidisciplinary group with environmental 
vision made an analysis of the management plan in the Osa region, an hot spot of 
biodiversity of Costa Rica. This study showed the evidence mismanagement of the modality 
of PES for forest management. They develop a mass media campaign against these 
practices. Under the pressure of environmentalist groups, an administrative ban was 
declared in 2000 by the ministry of environment to stop “forest management” and 
“established plantation” PES modalities.  
 
In spite of the risk of enlargement and dilution of the PES concept to other sector and the 
tension on the “forest management” and “established plantation” modality, the PESP gained 
its legitimacy since the demand from final beneficiary was important, especially for 
conservation modality. In this context, thanks to their mobilization, the forestry sector 
stakeholders achieved to secure and better schedule the fund from hydrocarbon tax to 
FONAFIFO. Indeed, the law # 7575 specified that 1/3 of hydrocarbon tax will be to dedicated 
to compensation forest owner, but not especially dedicated to FONAFIFO, with the 
negotiation of the reform of tax system (Ley de Simplificación y Eficiencia Tributarias, Nº 
8114 of 2001-2000), forestry sector achieved to secure the tax to a level of 3.5 % of unique 
tax on hydrocarbon20 and to earmarked to FONAFIFO (as unique seller of ES). 
b- 2002-2006: an inflexion toward environment and social purposes scheduled by 
environmentalists stakeholders and international influence  
 
The year 2002-2003 is marked by a change in balance of power between the different 
groups around forest issue that led to some changes in the PESP orientations toward a focus 
on environmental and social objectives and more oriented toward the interests of agriculture, 
small forest holders, and environmentalist’s stakeholders.  
 
From 2002, the interests groups supporting a productive vision of forest experienced a 
reduction of their power. Three factors led to this reduction (figure 8). Firstly, the CCF that 
has been the main organized representative force of private forestry sector began to fade. In 
1999, with the change of leading representatives of the CCF, the dialogue climate between 
the different tendencies represented in the CCF (large forestry enterprise, wood industry 
sector, small and medium forestry producers) began to change. And in the early 2000s, CCF 
experienced a rapid disaffiliation and reduction of its means. The small and medium forestry 
representatives (Junaforca) split from CCF, which concentrates then only a large forestry and 
industrial sectors. Secondly, the ONF that was supposed to represent the private sector, face 
financial difficulties, and was not able to counterbalance the reduction of strength of the CCF. 
Thirdly, the local forestry organizations begun to suffer from the reduction of the direct 
support they had in the 90s (Barrantes, 2009).  
 
20 During the negotiation, the ministry of economy proposed a fix amount, but the forest stakeholders achieved 
to obtain a 3.5 % of the hydrocarbon tax, which has enable to raise more fund since the increase of fuel price 
during the early 2000. 
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At the same time, stakeholders oriented toward a more environmental/conservation or social 
visions gained forces. Three factors enable them to gain forces (figure 8): 1) the raising 
influence of the international donors, 2) the change in policy leaders, and 3) the mobilization 
of specific subsectors. In the early 2000s, facing difficulties to obtain the entire fund 
dedicated to PESP from the Ministry of Economy and without obtaining expected fund from 
carbon market, negotiations between FONAFIFO and World Bank and GEF begun to raise 
funding sources. As a donor, according to their agenda, the World Bank and the GEF pushed 
toward a higher concern toward poverty reduction and environmental efficiency. In 2002, a 
new president, Abel Pacheco, nominate a new ministry of environment, Carlos Manuel 
Rodriguez. This new ministry was more sensible to environmentalists’ positions and 
favorable to the enlargement of PESP scheme to all activities that provide ES, as well as a 
better targeting of payment. He put in the board of FONAFIFO, a biologist, as representative 
of the ministry of environment. Thirdly, the concept of PES begun to be more discussed in 
the international and national academic forum, as pioneer and successful experience, the 
PESP became the subject of many studies that analyzed the effects of PESP on poverty (ref) 
and that debates its efficiency, especially in term of additionality. Moreover, the evaluation of 
ES provided by diverse ecosystems (such as agro-forestry system or sylvo pastoral systems) 
were developed and begun to provide some evidence of the ES provided by non-forests 
ecosystems. Moreover, other studies, such as Gruas 1, evidence the zone of higher 
biodiversity interests, giving tools to define better targeting according to biodiversity issue.  
 
 
Figure 8 : Changes affecting the balance of power of stakeholders (1997-2010) 
 1997-2001  2002-2006 2006-2010 
Forestry 
Stakeholders  
consolidation of CCF  
(until 1999) 
reduction of strength of CCF 
(separation of Junaforca, 
reduction of financial and 
technical resources) 
Lack of available national 
Important imports of wood 
Reduction of reforestation rate 
 economic difficulty of local forestry organization   
 limited leadership of ONF (lack of fund and technician)  
 
entry of international donors 
focusing poverty and 
environment objectives 
2006 : Change of government 
more climate change oriented 
2007 : carbon neutrality orientation 
and development of ENCC* 
Perspective of REDD 
environmental 
stakeholders 
1998: change of 
government 
1998: analysis of impact of 
management plan in OSA 
2002: change of ministry of 
environment more oriented 
toward environmental and 
social purpose 
 
2007: Reduction of cooperation 
financial supports following 
financial crisis  
Raise  citizen environmental consciousness 
 development of research on ES measurement, impact on poverty, efficiency 
agricultural 
stakeholders  SAF studies 
studies and mobilization of cafe 
sector and agricultural sector 
Learning process of agricultural 
representatives 
NB :  * ENCC : Stratégie nationale de changement climatique 
Source : Stakeholders interviews 2009-2010. 
 
This new configuration of the balance of power and resources between the different 
stakeholder’s of interests’ groups led to an inflexion of the PESP towards a stronger focus on 
environmental and social objectives to the detriment of a more productive oriented vision of 
the forest support. Hence, the unpopular PES modality for “forest management” and 
“established plantation” were abolished in 2003 and the “Agroforestry System” modality was 
introduced in 2003 after a campaign leaded by the representatives of small forestry 
(Junaforca) and of SINAC, and with the support of the minister of environment. Moreover, in 
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line with the environmental vision, emphasizing biodiversity concern, supported by SINAC 
civil servants, GEF and environmental groups, a prioritization system was put in place to 
better target ES payment towards biodiversity important areas but also to areas with lower 
development index.  
c- Since 2006: a multi-dimension evolution reflecting changes in balance of power 
and research for funding opportunities  
 
The late evolution of PESP shows a multidirectional evolution product of a learning process 
of stakeholders upon SE and PSE mechanisms in interaction with national and international 
and a complex equilibrium of balance of power between stakeholders. 
 
The forestry stakeholders oriented toward a more wood production vision, after a reduction of 
their power in the 2002-2006, have slightly recovered more resources to support their vision 
due to a new situation and evidences. First, the situation is drastically different than that 
which prevailed in the mid 1990 and that supported a conservation strategy. Whereas the 
deforestation rate was high and level of forest cover low in the 90s, in 2005, deforestation 
rate was low and the forest cover had risen to more than 50 % of the country. Although the 
abundance of forests, the restriction on forest exploitation led Costa Rica to import woods for 
industrial purpose, leading to important imports burden. Moreover in the framework of the 
objective of country Carbon neutrality in 2021 decided by the president Oscar Arias in 2007, 
the necessity to reduce carbon foot print is a new argument for productive vision of forest. By 
the way, a more intensive use of wood as material can be seen as a way to substitute higher 
carbon footprint material (as cement, or metals). With those new arguments, the PESP for 
forest management has been reintroduced in 2010.  
 
On the other side, environmental influence on PESP seems to slightly fade as the support 
from international NGO is reducing following the financial crisis of 2007 and, as other issues 
have been gaining more importance in the agenda of environmentalist organizations 
(campaign toward the interdiction of mining of Cruzitas in 2009-2010). Nevertheless, as the 
environmental national mood is still gaining force in the Costa Rican population following 
educational campaign of the last decade, the orientation toward forest conservation still 
important.   
 
The latest evolution of PESP appears as results of a learning process from various 
stakeholders of the pure market rhetoric of PES, and the research toward efficiency of 
payment following academic research and international influences, as well as funding 
opportunities. Hence, the opportunity of additional resources for PESP through GEF grant in 
the framework of Ecomercado 2 project tends to contribute to reinforce environmental 
orientation. As grant conditionality, it enables to differentiate payment leading enabling the 
creation in 2010 of a differentiated payment for conservation PES in area of high interest of 
biodiversity that are not included in other existing scheme of protection. In the same way, 
following the reform of the tax on water use, that lead to the increase of the level of tax and a 
channeled part 25 % of this tax to FONAFIFO for hydraulic ES, a differentiated payment has 
been set for conservation PES in areas of hydraulic interest. Finally, in the regeneration PES, 
with the possibility to access carbon fund, a differentiated payment for Kyoto eligible land has 
been introduced in 2010.  
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Conclusion 
 
The analysis of the genesis and evolution of PESP shows that it is characterized by 
continuity and inflexions they have not been merely guided by technical logic but reflect also 
an evolution of balance of power between different groups of stakeholders. The PESP 
appears initially as a genuine original construction in a political and social context of Costa 
Rica of the mid-1990s leaded by dominant forestry stakeholders, but its evolution have been 
more directly influenced by a change of this balance of power, characterized by a reduction 
of power of the forestry stakeholders and a strengthening of power of national stakeholders 
oriented toward environmental and social purpose, as well as a stronger influence of 
international actors such as donors. As the balance between stakeholders appears as an 
important explicative factor of the evolution of PESP, the search for funding source to sustain 
the PES has been one of the driving forces of evolution of PESP and the change of balance 
of power between the different stakeholders. The other driving force has been the learning 
process of the different stakeholders: 1) the learning process of the management institution 
(FONAFIFO) that had developed the capacity to adapt the instrument to new constraints and 
opportunities arising from national situation and international opportunities, and by the way, 
contribute to the success and continuity of the PESP, 2) the learning process of the 
stakeholders representing specific interests that have developed the capacity to better 
manage the concept of PES to support their vision.  
 
In opposition with a model of neutral market instrument, the PESP is an instrument 
responding to complex governance, where equilibrium of power among different 
stakeholders influences the orientation and functioning of the instrument. Hence, further 
evolution of PESP will then depends on the capacity of stakeholders to better manage the 
concept of PES and the changes in the balance of power between stakeholders in line with 
national and international context.  
‐  
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Le programme SERENA traite des enjeux liés à l’émergence de la notion de « service environnemental » dans le domaine des politiques 
publiques concernant le milieu rural. Cette notion prend en compte non seulement la fonction productive des écosystèmes à travers 
l’agriculture, traditionnellement appréhendée par les politiques agricoles, mais aussi d’autres fonctions : régulation, culturelles… 
 
 
 
 
L’objectif du programme SERENA est d’identifier les principes, les mécanismes et les instruments qui facilitent la prise en compte de la 
notion de service environnemental dans les nouveaux dispositifs d’action publique en milieu rural. Il s’agira de mieux comprendre les 
recompositions des politiques publiques et d’être en mesure d’élaborer des recommandations pratiques pour en améliorer la mise en œuvre. 
 
 
 
 
Le programme SERENA, d’une durée de 4 ans (2009-2012), repose sur une analyse comparative internationale (France, Costa-Rica et 
Madagascar) et mobilise environ 40 scientifiques, essentiellement de sciences sociales, issus d’organismes de recherche français (IRD, 
CIRAD, CEMAGREF, CNRS, ENGREF, Université de Montpellier 3, Université de Versailles St Quentin en Yvelines, ENITAC, INRA…). 
 
 
 
 
Les produits du programme SERENA (publications, guides opérationnels, CD Rom, site internet) seront déclinés pour deux publics 
principaux : la communauté scientifique et la communauté des acteurs impliqués dans les politiques environnementales et rurales 
(décideurs, experts, responsables d’organisations de la société civile et du secteur privé…). 
 
 
 
 
 
The SERENA programme deals with issues linked to the emergence of the concept of environmental service in rural public policies. In this 
context, ecosystems managed by agriculture are not only analysed from a traditional productive function perspective but also for their 
regulatory, cultural functions, and thus for the services linked to the maintenance of habitats, biodiversity and landscape. 
 
 
 
 
The overall objective of the SERENA programme is to identify the principles, mechanisms and instruments that enable for an incorporation of 
the environmental service concept in public action for rural areas. Findings help to adjust public policies and to give practical 
recommendations for service provision and management. 
 
 
 
 
 
The SERENA programme runs for a period of four years (2009-2012), to carry out an international comparative analysis (France, Costa Rica 
and Madagascar). The scientific research team consists of about 40 scientists mainly from social sciences, and from various French 
research institutes (IRD, CIRAD, CNRS, ENGREF, CEMAGREF, University of Montpellier 3, University of Versailles Saint Quentin en 
Yvelines, ENITAC, INRA…). 
 
 
 
The outcomes of the SERENA programme are publications, handbooks, CD ROMs and web pages targeting two user groups: the scientific 
community as well as stakeholders and decision-makers involved in environmental and rural policies formulation and implementation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
